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ABSTRACT
Themain aimof this studywas to construct a normative instrument for themeasurement of di¡erent levels ofmoral
reasoning.The sample comprised 426 undergraduate students in Industrial Psychology and PersonnelManagement
from twoAfrikaans speaking universities. Aquestionnairewas developed tomeasure di¡erent levels ofmoral reaso-
ning on a normative scale. A factor analysis on 90 items yielded two factors.These factorswere interpreted as princi-
pledmoral reasoning and prescriptivemoral reasoning.The two scaleswere subjected to an item analysis andyielded
reliability coe⁄cients of 0,936 and 0,937.The implications of these ¢ndings are discussed.
OPSOMMING
Die hoofdoel van die studie was om ’n normatiewe meetinstrument te konstrueer vir die meting van verskillende
vlakke van morele redenering. Die steekproef het uit 426 voorgraadse students in Bedryfsielkunde en Personeelbe-
stuur aan twee Afrikaanstalige universiteite bestaan. ’n Normatiewe skaal is ontwikkel om verskillende vlakke van
morele redenering temeet.’n Faktorontleding vandie 90 items in die skaal het twee faktore tot gevolg gehad, naamlik
principie« le morele redenering en voorskriftelike morele redenering. Die skale is vervolgens aan’n itemontleding on-
derwerp en het betroubaarhede van 0,936 en 0,947, onderskeidelik, opgelewer. Die implikasies van die bevindinge
word bespreek.
The question is raised, time and again, whether morality should
not be the life-artery of good business. Nevertheless, worldwide
crime, and white collar crime in particular, are the order of the
day (Stead,Worrell & Stead,1990). It appears thatmorality is con-
sidered in theory only.White-collar crime is rife in South Africa
and continually a¥icts local organisations and institutions. The
problems accompanying tax collection, for instance, illustrate
the grave lack of morality in South Africa (Rossouw, 1997).The
problem has reached such proportions that organisations have
found it necessary to launch a project like ‘‘Business Against Cri-
me’’, which among other things focuses on establishing strong
moral values within organisations. Furthermore, since 1994, the
King report on corporate management has made it compulsory
for organisations listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange to
present an annual report on the state of their ethical codes of con-
duct andmoral culture (Rossouw,1997).
In addition, there is a tendency for international organisations
to introduce £atter structures. This will have far-reaching ef-
fects since, until recently, organisational behaviour was regula-
ted by formal, multi-level structures and corresponding
modes of authority. This involved attempts to induce moral
behaviour by means of policy-making. In the absence of this
formal regulation of behaviour, the responsibility for moral
behaviour now lies with the individual (Rossouw,1997).
There will always be moral and ethical questions to deal with,
especially where there is con£ict between the interests of share-
holders and the personal values of employees. In this respectTre-
vino (1986) points out that managers on all levels tend to subject
their personal values to their own advance and success in the or-
ganisation. It is a cause for concern that, in spite of all the above-
mentioned considerations, organisations generally regard busin-
ess ethics as low on the list of strategic priorities (Robertson,
1996). Research in this area is therefore important.
The study of moral decision-making in organisations is cer-
tainly nothing new, and has, for some time, been a focus of
study in organisational psychology (Cadbury, 1987; Reilly &
Myroslaw, 1990; Stead et al., 1990;Trevino, 1986). There is ho-
wever still ample scope for research on this subject, and the
aim of this study was tomake a contribution to organisational
psychology through developing a normative instrument for
the measurement of moral reasoning.
As Jordaan and Jordaan (1992) explain, moral learning involves
the acquisition of ethical codes of behaviour. These codes of
behaviour are either universal or are accepted and prescribed
by a certain society and culture. In terms of these codes, people
judge behaviour as morally justi¢ed or unjusti¢ed. This ‘self-
judgement’ based on ethical codes of behaviour is related to
moral reasoning as described by Derry (1989) who regards
moral reasoning as a way of coping with moral con£icts. The
process includes a personal de¢nition and framework of the
moral con£ict, as well as evaluation and resolution of the con-
£ict. So di¡erent people experience moral con£ict in di¡erent
ways, evenwhen faced with the same situation.
A moral decision is, of course, made with speci¢c reasons in
mind, thus a comprehensive de¢nition of morality should in-
clude both behavioural and cognitive factors (Taylor,1977).Mo-
rality therefore involves moral reasoning or the reasons behind
moral decisions, as well as the behaviour accompanying these
decisions.
The nature of moral development will now be considered
from three points of view that have their roots in three of the
schools of Psychology. First, morality is approached from the
perspective of social learning theory, which adopts many of
the concepts employed by learning theory, to explain how
people develop and are socialised (Sieber,1980). In social learn-
ing theory, behaviour is seen to be acquired by direct learning,
modelling and imitation, and is maintained by positive rein-
forcement. Moral behaviour is viewed as the result of learned
responses conditioned by the social environment (Sieber,
1980). The process of acquiring moral behaviour depends on
what is considered right or wrong by the group, and is subject
to social sanctioning by the group (Windmiller, 1980). Thus,
the group or community determines which behaviours are
right or wrong, and a child learns these rules. In this way, a
child raised in a cannibalistic society will internalise canniba-
lism as an acceptable form of behaviour.
A second view of moral development is presented by psy-
choanalytical theory. This perspective, which is primarily in-
teractionist, considers the in£uences of interpersonal, familial
and socio-cultural factors on individual development includ-
ing his or her moral development (Tice, 1980). Society is seen
to dictate which behaviours are acceptable and which are not
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TABLE 1
LEVELSAND STAGES OF MORALREASONINGACCORDINGTO KOHLBERG
PRECONVENTIONAL LEVEL
At this level the individual is sensitive to cultural rules regarding what is considered right and wrong.The individual will, however, interpret right and wrong in terms of the physical consequences of his or her
actions (punishment, reward, exchange of favours) or in terms of the physical power of those who enunciate the rules.This level is divided into two stages:
Stage 1: Heteronomous Morality
This stage is characterised by na|«ve moral realism,with the moral importance of an action regarded as an inherent feature of the action. At this stage a person regards stealing as wrong because ‘‘one is not supposed
to steal.’’ There is very little or a complete absence of moral reasoning. Punishment plays an important role at this stage because it is associatedwith a‘wrong’action rather than the person pragmatically avoiding the
negative consequences of his or her actions.
Stage 2: Individualistic, Instrumental Morality
This stage is characterised by a concrete, individualistic perspective, implying that what is regarded as right or wrong is determined by the reward value of the behaviour. Other people’s needs do play a role, but
only in terms of an exchange; only when a favour has been shown, will it be returned.
CONVENTIONALLEVEL
At this stage the individual regards it as important tomeet the expectations of his or her family, group or community, regardless of the immediate consequences.The attitude is one of conformity and loyalty to the
expectations of the social order.The social order is actively maintained, supported and justi¢ed by those responsible.This level encompasses two stages.
Stage 3: Interpersonally Normative Morality
Kohlberg believes that this stage represents ‘correct’ behaviour which pleases people and of which they approve.The emphasis falls on conformity and stereotypical ideas accepted by the majority of people.
Stage 4: Social SystemMorality
Stage 4 is characterised bydoing one’s duty, the exercising of authority and themaintenance of the social order as part of society. At this stage the viewpoint is no longer restricted to the individual’s own family and
the common good plays an important role in moral decisions. Consequently the rules of society are accepted in a fairly uncritical way and observed as instruments of good order.
POSTCONVENTIONAL LEVEL
At this stage a clear e¡ort is made to de¢ne the values and principles of amoral society.These values and principles are upheldwithout necessarily enjoying the approval of the groups or persons who advocate these
principles and apart from the individual’s own identi¢cationwith these groups.This level also has two stages.
Stage 5: Human Rights and SocialWelfare Morality
Kohlberg believes that, in terms of this stage, right andwrong are determined democratically.They are matters of personal values and opinion based on universal values and rights that any personwould want to
incorporate into a moral society.The validity of existing laws and social systems can be evaluated in the light of these human rights and values.This can be done because, even though laws and rules guarantee the
rights of the individual and society, individual rights at times transcend laws and rules if the laws and rules seem destructive and unjust. Such unenforceable rules and laws should therefore not be obeyed at all costs,
but can be changed in a democratic manner.
Stage 6: Morality of Universalisable, Reversible, and Prescriptive General Ethical Principles
Stage 6 describes the ideal relationship between free, autonomous individuals. It involves an impartial consideration of the circumstances or case of each person a¡ected by amoral decision. Justice, impartiality and
reciprocity are guaranteed during the decision-making.
(from Daniels, 1984; Jordaan and Jordaan,1992; Kohlberg and Kramer, 1969; Kohlberg,1973; Kohlberg, 1976; Kohlberg, 1980; Kohlberg,1988).
(Jordaan & Jordaan, 1992). Although this approach is seem-
ingly similar to that of social learning theory, Hugo andVan
Vuuren (1995) highlight the di¡erence between them. In the
psychoanalytic view, learning is regarded as static: but accord-
ing to social learning theory it is an ongoing process.
Thirdly, moral reasoning is considered from a cognitive point of
view.According to this framework, the individual’s internal pro-
cesses are just as important for development as the environ-
mental context (Glassman, 1979). The emphasis no longer falls
on the process of social conditioning, but on rational consi-
derations as to what is right or wrong (Penn & Collier, 1985).
These rational considerations are seen as successive, clearly dis-
tinguishable patterns of reasoning which form a developmental
sequence, fromconcrete and egocentric to abstract and universal.
The cognitive approach has its origins in the work of Piaget
(Penn & Collier, 1985). Piaget proposed that cognitive processes
formcoherent systems that adapt to changing environmental sti-
muli.Thus, the humanmind does notmerely absorb discrete da-
ta withwhich it comes into contact, but endeavours to organise
it (Piaget,1950). As a result, individuals develop a need to obtain
relevant information fromthe environment to create ameaning-
ful system that will foster interaction with the world (Penn &
Collier, 1985). The type of information an individual obtains
from the environment is according to Damon (1980) a function
of the individual’s current knowledge and abilities. As a result of
the individual’s continous organisation of changing environ-
mental stimuli, new forms of behaviour emerge.
Piaget never proceeded with his early work on morality and
his stage-theory of moral development was later extended by
Lawrence Kohlberg. Like other structuralists, Kohlberg (1976)
was not interested in moral behaviour, as such, but rather in
the waymoral decision-making andmoral reasoning take pla-
ce. According to Kohlberg, an individual’s level of cognitive
development will determine the constraints on his or her pro-
gression through the stages of moral development (Kohl-
berg, 1976; Kohlberg, 1980; Rest, 1986; Rest, 1988;Windmiller,
1980). In the light of the relationship between cognition and
moralityWindmiller (1980) de¢nes morality as the di¡erence
between that which is right andwrong, where ‘right’refers to a
universal truth. Consequently moral development is not pe-
culiar to a speci¢c culture, but inherent in all cultures (Ey-
senck, 1994). From this point of view the supposition that
moral development constitutes the internalisation of cultural
norms is rejected.
By far the most in£uential theory of the three already men-
tioned is the cognitive theory of learning or structuralist ap-
proach (Jordaan & Jordaan, 1992). According toTuriel (1980),
Piaget initially suggested that moral development consists
moral development is not peculiar to a speci¢c culture, but in-
herent in all cultures (Eysenck, 1994). From this point of view
the supposition that moral development constitutes the inter-
nalisation of cultural norms is rejected.
By far the most in£uential theory of the three already men-
tioned is the cognitive theory of learning or structuralist ap-
proach (Jordaan & Jordaan, 1992). According toTuriel (1980),
Piaget initially suggested that moral development consists lte-
rable physical laws rooted in nature. As the child develops, his
or her morality will change from a form of one-sided respect
to a morality of co-operation and mutual respect (the autono-
mous level).Turiel (1980) believes that this level is founded on
concepts like reciprocity and equality. Rules are no longer re-
garded as mysterious or unalterable but rather as the outcome
of a mutual agreement supporting the objectives of co-opera-
tion and, consequently, as negotiable and adaptable. Central to
the above-mentioned, is the development of morality along a
continuum, ranging from an external orientation to an inter-
nal orientation (Nichols & Day,1982).
Kohlberg revised Piaget’s ‘two-stage theory’and extended it to
six stages of moral development (Turiel, 1980). An outline of
the stages is contained inTable 1.
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The de¢nite sequence of six stages is characterised by distinct
di¡erences in structure, and a hierarchical integration of lower
stages into higher stages of reasoning. Stages of moral devel-
opment are quanti¢able, and a fewmeasuring instruments ba-
sed on Kohlberg’s theory will now be discussed.
Instruments designed to measure moral reasoning
In developing his theory of moral reasoning Kohlberg (1980)
used a speci¢c research procedure. He presented boys, aged ten
to sixteen years, from di¡erent cultures, with stories posing
moral dilemmas. These boys had to resolve the dilemmas
supplying reasons for their decisions and answering certain
questions. On the basis of the type of reasoning used by the
boys, Kohlberg (1973) postulated his pattern of six quali-
tatively di¡erent stages of moral reasoning. He found that no
stage is omitted and that approximately 50% of an individual’s
moral decisions can be classi¢ed in a particular stage, which
indicates the individual’s current level of moral reasoning
(Kohlberg, 1973; McGeorge, 1974). The remaining moral deci-
sions made by the individual fall in the previous and subse-
quent stages, which indicates that there is a continuous
process of moral development (McGeorge, 1974). If, for in-
stance, an individual uses Stage 2 reasoning 70% of the time,
and Stage1reasoning 30%of the time, his or her level ofmoral
reasoning would be classi¢ed as Stage 2. The dominant stage
inwhich an individual’s responses are classi¢ed, is known as his
or her global score. An obvious disadvantage of this procedure
is that an individual is con¢ned to one stage of moral reaso-
ning. On account of this restriction Kohlberg expanded his
theory so that an individual could function in more than one
stage simultaneously (McGeorge,1974).
A second measuring instrument, designed by McGeorge, is
called the ‘‘Moral Maturity Scale’’(McGeorge,1974). A system
of weights is used in scoring: the ordinal positions of the sta-
ges reached are multiplied with the percentage of time the
stage is used.The products are then summed to give the ¢nal
score. According to this method of scoring the individual in
the above-mentioned example would obtain a score of 170 if
stage two reasoning was used 70% of the time and stage one
reasoning 30% of the time (2 x 70 + 1 x 30 = 170). If the in-
dividual used stage two reasoning100% of the time, the score
would amount to 200. It is clear that theMoral Maturity Sca-
le yields a score that is more sensitive than Kohlberg’s global
score.
According to Nichols and Day (1982) the development of the
‘‘De¢ning Issues Test’’ (‘‘DIT’’) by Rest (1974) ^ also based on
the work of Kohlberg ^ constitutes a further milestone in mea-
suring levels of moral reasoning. In the light of the complexity
of the criteria used byKohlberg, the‘‘DIT’’was seen as an impor-
tant breakthrough. Respondents ¢nd recognition exercises such
as the‘‘DIT’’easier to complete than, for example, the production
exercises used by Kohlberg (Rest, 1986).The questions are pres-
ented in multiple-choice format which rules out the problem of
moral reasoning being restricted by an individual’s inability to
verbalise his or her thoughts.
Rest (1986) explains that the ‘‘DIT’’ requires the respondent to
select answers from three given possibilities relating to moral
dilemmas. Next the respondent has to select twelve possible
reasons for each answer and rank the four most important rea-
sons (Davidson & Robbins,1978; Nichols & Day,1982).
A further study undertaken to obtain a more valid repre-
sentation of an individual’s level of moral reasoning was that
of Taylor (1977). In an attempt to overcome the shortcomings
of Kohlberg’s theoryTaylor developed a new questionnaire,
the Reasons for Actions Questionnaire. It was designed in
such a way that moral arguments relating to four stages,
(namely Stages 2 5 of Kohlberg’s stages of moral reasoning),
could be formulated.This meant that an individual could re-
spond to questions relating to any of these four stages with
equal ease. Taylor (1977), however, departed from open-en-
ded questions like those used by Kohlberg, because they are
unsatisfactory for measuring moral reasoning. Open-ended
responses are usually so short and ambiguous that they make
evaluation all but impossible. Consequently, Taylor (1977)
made use of a ¢xed response format.
Taylor (1977) refuted the supposition that a ¢xed response for-
mat would lead to respondents arguing on higher levels of
moral reasoning. He found that lower levels of moral reason-
ing elicited the same proportion of responses. However, in
Hugo and Van Vuuren’s (1995) research, where Taylor’s ¢xed
response format was used, a large number of the respondents
were categorised in the ¢fth stage of moral reasoning.
Furthermore,Taylor’s instrument is ipsative in nature. It is thus
impossible to use theReasons forActionsQuestionnaire to com-
pare di¡erent individuals at the same stage of moral reasoning.
The reason being that ipsative scores are systematically in£uen-
ced byother scores and each individual’s scores produce the same
mean and standard deviation, thus providing no standard against
which to compare them.The most important limitation of ipsa-
tive measurement is that parametric statistics cannot be used be-
cause ipsative measurements are not independent of one another
and they lead to a preponderance of negative intercorrelations.
Kerlinger (1986) points out that most statistical tests are based
on the assumption that the elements used in statistical tests are
independent of one another. If this is not the case, aswith ipsative
measurements, an analysis of correlations, for example factor
analysis, could lead to misleading results on account of the spu-
rious negative intercorrelations. In the light of the above-men-
tioned it must be pointed out that all the available instruments
for the measurement of moral reasoning are at least partly ipsati-
ve in nature. The aim of this study was therefore to construct a
scale ofmoral reasoningwith normative rather than ipsative pro-
perties.
In the construction of scales, questions can be used, or positive
or negative statements can be made. Likert scales involve state-
ments, and the respondents have to indicate the extent to
which they agree or disagree with the statements. According
to Schepers (1992) a seven-point scale is less restrictive on the
variance of a scale, yet easy to respond to. Consequently, in the
construction of the new measuring instrument a seven-point
scale was chosen. Every ‘‘reason for action’’ is linked to a seven-
point scale varying from‘‘do not agree at all’’ to‘‘fully agree’’.
METHOD
Sample
A sample of 426 was drawn from undergraduate students in
Industrial Psychology and Personnel Management, at two
universities in the Gauteng area. An analysis of the sample
indicated that 54% were Afrikaans-speaking and 29% Eng-
lish-speaking, while 13% recorded an African language and
4% another language as their mother tongue. All the stu-
dents in the relevant classes (apart from those who were ab-
sent) were selected in order to ensure the randomness of the
sample.
Measuring instruments
The Moral Reasoning Questionnaire (MRQ)
Since only ipsative and semi-ipsative instruments are available
for themeasurement ofmoral reasoning, a normative scale was
constructed and relevant data collected. In preparation for the
construction of the scale the most recent literature was studied
in order to evaluate the availablemeasuring instruments and to
identify typical behaviour associated with each level of rea-
soning. Kohlberg’s theory was used as the foundation because
it is by far the most comprehensive theory of moral reasoning.
Each of the six stages as described by Kohlberg was analysed
with the intent of identifying concepts associated with each
speci¢c stage.The next step involved identifying dilemmas af-
fecting under-graduate students. The dilemmas addressed the
following issues: theft, adultery, dishonesty, fraud and integri-
ty. A normative scale was decided upon, after which items we-
re designed and a questionnaire developed. Amoral dilemma,
for instance a potential theft, was described and six reasons
for conduct (based on Kohlberg’s six stages of moral
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TABLE 2
SAMPLE ITEM
Youwork in the marketing section of a large banking group and attend a seminar with other
marketing experts. One of the people attending the seminar is the marketing director of your
greatest competitor. You overhear him discussing his bank’s marketing strategy with his col-
leagues and notice that he has left his briefcase open in which lies a copy of the marketing
strategy. Since his back is turned, you have an opportunity to remove the document that will
give you important information about your competitor’s marketing strategy.You do not take
the copy because:
1. You would not want him to steal your marketing plan and what would everyone think of
you, if you did.
strongly disagree strongly agree
2. You consider the possible harmful e¡ects of your action on the marketing director and ot-
her people in the company concerned and decide for this reason to leave the document
untouched.
strongly disagree strongly agree
3. If you take the copy there is a very good chance that youwill be caught and upset the mar-
keting manager so badly, that it could cost you your career.
strongly disagree strongly agree
4. You risk possible prosecution because such behaviour is against the law.
strongly disagree strongly agree
5. If the marketing director sees you, he will expose you as a thief.
strongly disagree strongly agree
6. You believe that you, as an individual, have no right to take information belonging to anot-
her individual or business, without their consent.
strongly disagree strongly agree
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
TABLE 3
MATRIXOF INTERCORRELATIONSOF SUBTESTS OF THEMORALREASONING QUESTIONNAIRE
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19
SUBTEST 1 1,000
SUBTEST 2 0,083 1,000
SUBTEST 3 0,321 0,089 1,000
SUBTEST 4 -0,229 -0,133 -0,087 1,000
SUBTEST 5 0,229 0,038 0,235 -0,179 1,000
SUBTEST 6 0,214 0,284 0,173 -0,156 0,181 1,000
SUBTEST 7 0,234 0,014 0,248 -0,127 0,337 0,222 1,000
SUBTEST 8 -0,201 -0,143 -0,238 0,121 -0,258 -0,241 -0,265 1,000
SUBTEST 9 0,139 0,045 0,100 -0,163 0,218 0,141 0,183 -0,246 1,000
SUBTEST 10 0,237 0,092 0,173 -0,246 0,248 0,143 0,191 -0,221 0,294 1,000
SUBTEST 11 -0,252 -0,113 -0,198 0,264 -0,269 -0,243 -0,269 0,301 -0,345 -0,345 1,000
SUBTEST 12 -0,070 -0,179 0,019 0,121 0,075 -0,077 -0,053 0,090 -0,008 -0,018 0,049 1,000
SUBTEST 13 -0,267 -0,071 -0,201 0,354 -0,255 -0,229 -0,160 0,152 -0,249 -0,274 0,298 -0,016 1,000
SUBTEST 14 0,188 0,116 0,049 -0,279 0,216 0,170 0,120 -0,179 0,238 0,322 -0,303 -0,005 -0,283 1,000
SUBTEST 15 0,067 -0,199 0,106 -0,017 0,122 -0,023 0,130 -0,080 0,141 0,102 -0,093 0,099 -0,146 0,008 1,000
SUBTEST 16 0,103 0,154 0,043 -0,059 0,092 0,134 0,082 -0,086 0,110 0,038 -0,067 0,080 -0,050 0,139 -0,151 1,000
SUBTEST 17 -0,289 0,117 -0,206 0,192 -0,190 -0,002 -0,144 0,187 -0,126 -0,212 0,255 0,114 0,224 -0,194 -0,182 -0,001 1,000
SUBTEST 18 -0,158 -0,235 -0,128 0,139 -0,015 -0,162 -0,071 0,192 -0,027 -0,056 0,096 0,198 0,114 -0,035 0,117 -0,114 -0,021 1,000
SUBTEST 19 0,120 0,276 0,005 -0,18 0,116 0,185 0,111 -0,-58 0,198 0,174 -0,163 -0,043 0,090 0,253 -0,200 0,282 0,036 -0,091 1,000
reasoning) were provided. SeeTable 2 for an example of one
of the dilemmas.The respondents were expected to evaluate
each of the six reasons on a seven-point scale ranging from
‘‘fully agree’’ to ‘‘don’t agree at all’’. As the questionnaire con-
sisted of ¢fteen moral dilemmas each involving six possible
reasons for action it contained a total of 90 items.The dilem-
mas are described brie£y and various reasons (each re£ecting
a particular stage) are provided to explainwhy the actor cho-
se not to act improperly.This format was speci¢cally chosen
to diminish the likelihood of socially desirable responses.
The questionnaire was then given to three experts with the re-
quest that they evaluate the given responses in terms of Kohl-
berg’s (1985) di¡erent levels of moral reasoning i.e. they were
asked to indicate to what extent they agreed that a speci¢c item
actually represented a speci¢c level ofmoral reasoning.Ten other
people were then requested to identify all the items that were
di⁄cult to respond to and to assist in editing them.
Social desirability
The newly constructed instrument uses a ¢xed response for-
mat. A disadvantage of this format is that it can lead to the se-
lection of higher-level responses that seem socially desirable
rather than truthful (Taylor, 1977; Hugo & VanVuuren, 1995).
To control for the possibility of obtaining socially desirable
responses, the ‘‘Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale’’
was used. This instrument was developed by Crowne and
Marlowe, and consists of 33 items, each coupled to a true or
false option (Crowne & Marlowe, 1960). The reliability of the
instrument is 0,88 and the test-retest reliability is 0,89.
Procedure
The Moral Reasoning Questionnaire and the ‘‘Marlowe-Crow-
ne Social Desirability Scale’’were administered to 426 undergra-
duate students. The goal of the study was explained to the
students before the questionnaires were handed out. There was
no time restriction on the completion of the questionnaires.
RESULTS
Factor analysis
To counteract the e¡ect of di¡erential skewness (of the test
items), the following procedure was followed in the factor
analysis of the Moral Reasoning Questionnaire (MRQ). First
the 90 items of theMRQwere inter-correlated and the matrix
of intercorrelations was subjected to a principal factor analysis.
The unreduced intercorrelation matrix yielded 19 eigenvalues
greater than unity. Accordingly 19 factors were extracted
(Kaiser, 1961). Next, the obtained factor matrix was rotated to
simple structure with the aid of aVarimax rotation. Following
this, subtests were formed, by summing all the scores of items
with high loadings on a factor. In this way, 16 subtests were
formed.Three of the factors were eliminated because the item
loadings were very low. Next the 16 sub-tests were intercor-
related and the matrix of intercorrelations was subjected to a
principal factor analysis.
The unreduced intercorrelation matrix of the subtests yielded
two eigenvalues greater than unity. Accordingly two factors
were extracted.The obtained factor matrix was rotated to sim-
ple structure with the aid of a Direct Oblimin rotation. The
matrix of intercorrelations is given inTable 3 and the eigenva-
lues inTable 4.The rotated factor matrix is given inTable 5.
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TABLE 4
EIGENVALUES OF UNREDUCED
INTERCORRELATIONMATRIX
ROOT EIGENVALUES
1 *7,340
2 *1,290
3 *0,922
4 *0,815
5 *0,728
6 *0,676
7 *0,565
8 *0,554
9 *0,524
10 *0,482
11 *0,410
12 *0,395
13 *0,387
14 *0,339
15 *0,305
16 *0,270
TRACE 16,000
TABLE 5
ROTATED FACTORMATRIX
(DIRECTOBLIMIN ROTATION)
ITEMS FACTOR I FACTOR II h2j
SUBTEST 1 2.4, 4.6,5.1,6.5,7.4,7.5, 8.3, 8.4, 8.5, 9.6, 12.1, 12.2, 12.3
13.5, 14.3, 14.4, 14.6, 15.2, 15.3, 15.6
0,099 0,650 0,518
SUBTEST 2 10.1, 10.2, 10.3, 10.4, 10.5,10.6 0,118 0,538 0,388
SUBTEST 3 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, 3.4, 3.5, 3.6 0,190 0,420 0,318
SUBTEST 4 8.6,12.6,13.1, 13.2, 13.4, 13.6, 15.5 0,759 0,014 0,591
SUBTEST 5 5.2, 5.3, 5.4, 5.5, 5.6 0,602 0,060 0,414
SUBTEST 6 6.1, 6.2, 6.3, 6.4, 6.6 0,422 0,406 0,571
SUBTEST 7 2.1, 2.2, 2.3, 2.5, 2.6 0,719 -0,107 0,426
SUBTEST 8 4.1, 4.2, 4.3, 4.4, 4.5 0,658 -0,012 0,422
SUBTEST 9 9.1, 9.2, 9.3, 9.4, 9.5 0,006 0,800 0,647
SUBTEST 10 11.1, 11.2, 11.4, 11.5, 11.6 0,318 0,466 0,515
SUBTEST 11 7.1, 7.2, 7.3, 7.6 0,243 0,511 0,485
SUBTEST 12 12.4,12.5,15.1,15.4 0,493 0,322 0,558
SUBTEST 13 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 1.4,1.5, 1.6 0,420 0,181 0,310
SUBTEST 14 11.3,13.3 -0,176 0,782 0,459
SUBTEST 15 14.1, 14.2,14.5 0,426 0,374 0,533
SUBTEST 16 8.1, 8.2 0,642 0,037 0,445
Items per factor 42 48
TABLE 6
INTERCORRELATIONSOF FACTORS
FACTOR I FACTOR II
FACTOR I 1,000
FACTOR II 0,665 1,000
TABLE 7
ITEM STATISTICS IN RESPECTOF SCALE I
Item Xg Sg rgxSg rgx
Q1.1 5,514 1,693 0,857 0,506
Q1.2 5,355 1,663 0,786 0,472
Q1.3 5,730 1,572 0,616 0,392
Q1.4 5,889 1,436 0,598 0,417
Q1.5 5,686 1,551 0,550 0,355
Q1.6 6,007 1,606 0,808 0,503
Q2.1 5,916 1,383 0,700 0,506
Q2.2 6,200 1,156 0,587 0,508
Q2.3 5,784 1,505 0,837 0,556
Q2.5 6,125 1,318 0,799 0,606
Q2.6 5,425 1,525 0,597 0,391
Q4.1 5,714 1,488 0,632 0,425
Q4.2 5,875 1,298 0,572 0,444
Q4.3 6,025 1,267 0,684 0,540
Q4.4 5,911 1,452 0,792 0,545
Q4.5 6,193 1,230 0,721 0,586
Q5.2 5,536 1,552 0,704 0,545
Q5.3 6,082 1,368 0,780 0,570
Q5.4 5,484 0,655 1,068 0,645
Q5.5 5,118 1,781 0,947 0,532
Q5.6 6,002 1,322 0,796 0,602
Q6.1 5,125 1,698 0,963 0,567
Q6.2 5,464 1,466 0,881 0,601
Q6.3 5,770 1,309 0,738 0,564
Q6.4 5,409 1,559 0,922 0,592
Q6.6 5,711 1,511 0,956 0,633
Q8.1 6,186 1,166 0,691 0,593
Q8.2 5,941 1,440 0,760 0,528
Q8.6 6,227 1,222 0,610 0,499
Q12.4 6,141 1,430 0,818 0,572
Q12.5 6,382 1,190 0,736 0,618
Q12.6 6,509 1,052 0,501 0,476
Q13.1 6,568 1,024 0,586 0,572
Q13.2 6,245 1,466 0,703 0,480
Q13.4 5,916 1,541 0,842 0,547
Q13.6 6,505 1,001 0,554 0,554
Q14.1 5,509 1,604 0,916 0,571
Q14.2 5,716 1,509 0,960 0,636
Q14.5 6,141 1,378 0,872 0,633
Q15.1 5,352 1,805 0,835 0,463
Q15.4 5,970 1,537 0,873 0,568
Q15.5 6,495 1,080 0,662 0,613
rgxSg = Index of reliability of item g
rgx=Correlation of item g with total
Sg= Standard deviation of item g
8g=Mean of item g
TABLE 8
ITEMS OF SCALES I AND II CATEGORISEDACCORDING
TO LEVELOFMORALREASONING
Level of Items of Items of
moral reasoning Scale I Scale II
1 10 5
2 1 14
3 5 10
4 6 9
5 10 5
6 10 5
42 48
From an inspection of Table 5 it appears that both factors are
well determined, with 42 items loading on Factor I and 48 on
Factor II. The inter-correlation between the two factors
(r=0,665) is given inTable 6.
Item analysis
Next, two scales were formed by assigning all the items with
high loadings on Factor I to Scale I and all the items with high
loadings on Factor II to Scale II. Following this, the two scales
were subjected to item analysis. The NP50 programme of the
National Institute for Personnel Research was used for this
purpose.
None of the items of Scale I were rejected, and a reliability
coe⁄cient of 0,936 was obtained (according to Cronbach’s
coe⁄cient alpha).The item statistics of Scale I are given in Ta-
ble 7.The item-means range from 5,118 to 6,568 and the stan-
dard deviations of the items from1,001 to 1,805.The item-test
correlations range from 0,355 to 0,645 and the indices of relia-
bility vary from 0,501to1,068. A further analysis of the Scale I
items reveals that Stages 1, 5 and 6 of Kohlberg’s moral-judge-
ment theory each appears ten times in Scale I, and that Stages
2, 3 and 4 appear considerably less frequently (seeTable 8).The
content of the items thus mainly concern Stages 1, 5 and 6 of
moral reasoning. Scale 1 is characterised by principled reaso-
ning (Stages 5 and 6) as well as intuitively principled reactions
(principled intuition) (Stage 1), which probably involves very
little moral reasoning in comparisonwith Stages 5 and 6. De-
cisions concerning correct behaviour in Scale I are arrived at
by intuitive knowledge of what is right (Stage 1) and an un-
derstanding of the principles of human rights, justice and im-
partiality (Stages 5 & 6). Consequently, Scale I was identi¢ed
as Principled Moral Reasoning.
None of the Scale II items were rejected during the iteration
process, and a reliability coe⁄cient of 0,947 (according to
Cronbach’s coe⁄cient alpha) was obtained.The item statistics
regarding Scale II are given inTable 9.The item-means range
from 3,714 to 6,270 and the standard deviations of the items
from 1,186 to 2,011. The item-test correlations range from
0,375 to 0,657 and the indices of reliability vary from 0,587 to
1,144. A further analysis of the Scale II items reveals that Stage
2 of Kohlberg’s moral-judgement theory appears fourteen ti-
mes and Stages 3 and 4 ten and nine times respectively, and
that Stages 1, 5 and 6 appear ¢ve times each (seeTable 8). The
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TABLE 9
ITEM STATISTICS IN RESPECTOF SCALE II
Items Xg Sg rgxSg rgx
Q2.4 5,109 1,661 0,624 0,375
Q3.1 5,045 1,790 0,793 0,443
Q3.2 4,934 1,793 0,802 0,447
Q3.3 5,395 1,691 0,905 0,535
Q3.4 3,714 1,873 1,020 0,544
Q3.5 4,811 1,957 0,860 0,440
Q3.6 5,102 1,890 0,807 0,427
Q4.6 5,491 1,693 0,721 0,426
Q5.1 4,580 1,807 0,784 0,434
Q6.5 5,068 1,719 0,769 0,447
Q7.1 5,011 1,981 1,021 0,516
Q7.2 5,698 1,740 0,841 0,484
Q7.3 5,350 1,700 0,986 0,580
Q7.4 6,014 1,462 0,712 0,487
Q7.5 5,270 1,770 1,039 0,587
Q7.6 5,875 1,488 0,928 0,624
Q8.3 5,409 1,596 0,899 0,563
Q8.4 4,898 1,665 0,988 0,594
Q8.5 5,173 1,636 0,969 0,592
Q9.1 5,650 1,638 0,872 0,532
Q9.2 4,011 1,867 1,144 0,613
Q9.3 4,650 1,785 1,050 0,588
Q9.4 5,123 1,730 1,128 0,652
Q9.5 5,302 1,588 0,909 0,573
Q9.6 5,143 1,772 1,141 0,644
Q10.1 4,573 2,010 0,991 0,493
Q10.2 4,745 2,011 1,033 0,514
Q10.3 5,964 1,595 0,793 0,497
Q10.4 5,773 1,683 0,898 0,534
Q10.5 5,855 1,611 0,998 0,620
Q10.6 6,045 1,475 0,800 0,543
Q11.1 5,345 1,660 0,939 0,566
Q11.2 5,530 1,468 0,723 0,493
Q11.3 4,395 1,847 1,112 0,602
Q11.4 5,359 1,591 0,791 0,497
Q11.5 5,302 1,724 0,892 0,518
Q11.6 6,134 1,186 0,587 0,495
Q12.1 6,077 1,393 0,777 0,558
Q12.2 5,893 1,500 0,986 0,657
Q12.3 5,518 1,761 0,974 0,553
Q13.3 4,898 1,966 1,026 0,522
Q13.5 5,759 1,677 0,856 0,510
Q14.3 4,811 1,802 1,133 0,629
Q14.4 5,905 1,343 0,871 0,648
Q14.6 5,507 1,704 1,066 0,626
Q15.2 5,695 1,653 0,887 0,537
Q15.3 6,270 1,225 0,731 0,597
Q15.6 6,025 1,459 0,791 0,542
rgxSg = Index of reliability of item g
rgx = Correlation of item g with total
Sg = Standard deviation of item g
8g = Mean of item g
TABLE 10
CORRELATIONSOF THEMARLOWE-CROWNE SOCIALDESIRABILITY
SCALEWITH SCALES I AND II OF THE MRQ
(MORALREASONING QUESTIONNAIRE)
Scale I Scale
5% 6%
MARLOWE-CROWNE 0,227 0,247
5% 6%
content of the items therefore relates mainly to Stages 2, 3 and 4
of moral reasoning. It seems that people who reason on these
levels do so in accordance with prescriptions from authority ¢-
gures, legislation, social expectations or to avoid punishment.
Their moral reasoning and associated behaviour are thus regula-
ted and prescribed by external sources; consequently, the scale
was identi¢ed as Prescriptive Moral Reasoning.
The two scales of the Moral Reasoning Questionnaire were
furthermore correlated with the scores of the ‘‘Marlowe-
Crowne Social Desirability Scale’’. From the matrix in Table
10 it is evident that there are statistically signi¢cant positive
correlations between Principled Moral Reasoning and the
‘‘Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale’’. The magnitude
of the correlations is, however, small (0,227 to 0,247). Social
desirability thus seems to play a minor role in the Moral Rea-
soning Questionnaire.
DISCUSSION
The results obtained in the present study yielded two scales of
moral reasoning. These have been called Principled Moral
Reasoning and Prescriptive Moral Reasoning and conform
to Piaget’s two-stage theory rather than Kohlberg’s six-stage
theory of moral reasoning. As has been pointed out, Piaget
distinguished between amorality of co-operation and a mora-
lityof limitation. A fewpoints of comparison between Piaget’s
theory and the scales of the Moral reasoning Questionnaire
will now be discussed.
PrincipledMoral Reasoning can be said to represent Stages1, 5
and 6 of Kohlberg’s theory of moral reasoning and also bears
resemblance to Piaget’s morality of co-operation. Piaget’s mo-
rality of co-operation is similar to Kohlberg’s Stages 5 and 6 in
the sense that the concepts of personal values and opinions,
justice, impartiality and reciprocity are involved. Of interest,
however, is that naive moral realism (Stage 1) forms part of
principled moral reasoning, while its description resembles
the morality of limitation. (According to the description of
Stage 1, the moral foundation of an action is regarded as an in-
herent, unchangeable and absolute characteristic of the action.)
A possible explanation for this deviation from Piaget’s theory
is that naive moral realism basically involves intuition rather
than moral reasoning or following instructions.
Prescriptive moral reasoning (Stages 2, 3 and 4) corresponds to
Piaget’s morality of limitation, where morality is regulated
and dictated by the reward value of an action, the expectations
of the family, group or community as well as rules laid down
by society. Furthermore, in Piaget’s theory, the two stages fol-
lowone another but the scope of this studydoes not allowone
to determinewhether prescriptive and principledmoral reaso-
ning follow a hierarchical course or not.
Principled moral reasoning seems to take place in two ways,
namely in a naive-intuitive manner (Stage 1) and a principled,
well-reasoned manner (Stages 5 and 6). The question arises
whether principled moral reasoning, which rests on certain
principles and intuition instead of external instruction, leads
to a greater amount of consistency between the individual’s
public and secret moral behaviour. It can also be askedwhether
a person whose moral behaviour is dictated by external in-
struction, such as legislation or group norms, will behave in a
consistent way, especially in the absence of instruction. It will
require further research to answer questions of this nature.This
kind of research would be important in the light of the intro-
ductory discussion regarding £atter structures in organisations
and the accompanying individual responsibility for moral be-
haviour in the absence of formal regulation.
Furthermore, the correlation between scores on the Principled
Moral Reasoning Scale and the Prescriptive Moral Reasoning
Scale is 0,665, making it possible that an individual might attain
moderate to high scores on both of the scales. A possible reason
for the overlap can be attributed to the fact that respondents are
presentedwith reasons for action associatedwith all the stages of
moral reasoning.Thus, if a respondent reasoned at level ¢ve, this
does not preclude reasoning at lower levels as well. For example
a person may choose not cheat because of reasons of fairness
(Stage 5) but would also choose not to violate the rules of the
university (Stage 4).
Norms were calculated and made available to determine the
position of an individual relative to his or her norm group.
The limited scope of the study does not make it possible, ho-
wever, to determine the hierarchical course of development of
the di¡erent stages.
Using the Moral Reasoning Questionnaire to determine dif-
ferent levels of moral reasoning of managers in organisations
may be regarded as simplistic. In reality, moral behaviour is
complex and one must take into account the relative nature
thereof (De Klerk, 1991) as well as the fact that people behave
in di¡erent ways without deliberately being unethical.
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This does not imply that a lack of moral behaviour should be
accepted without question but that such instances require an
attitude of tolerance rather than blind condemnation. In this
regard, the Moral Reasoning Questionnaire provides a useful
means for exploring the underlying reasons for behaviour so as
to promote greater understanding in the work place. For, des-
pite the complex nature of moral behaviour, it is only those
who work in organisations who can allow ethical behaviour
to amount to more than a message on paper.
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